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Rebecca M. Bratspies*† 
INTRODUCTION 
 The promise of biotechnology has been tantalizingly just beyond reach 
for a number of years.1 
 Conventional wisdom suggests that biotechnology may hold enormous 
promise for increasing agricultural production, improving sustainability, 
and offering more nutritious food to the public. Promises of increased 
yield2—more food for a hungry world3 and more profit for struggling 
farmers4—are dangled alongside claims that biotechnology crops result in 
decreased pesticide use5 and lower environmental impacts.6 Taken together, 
these claims buttress the oft-repeated assertion that agricultural 
biotechnology is a critical tool for improving human well-being. From this 
vantage point, it is relatively easy to caricature opponents of the technology 
as modern day Luddites7—or worse, unthinking elitists willing to sacrifice 
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        1. Ismail Serageldin, Speech: Agriculture's Role in Sustainable Human Development: An 
Action Agenda for the New Millennium, http://www.serageldin.com/SpeechDetail.aspx?SID= 
g406tiDW2qmQ48TrjbViAw%3D%3D (last visited Apr. 25, 2013). 
 2. Do GM Crops Increase Yields, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/ 
do-gm-crops-increase-yield.aspx. (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).  
 3. See, e.g., Maggie Urry, Genetic products row worsens, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 20, 1997, 4 
(quoting former USDA Secretary Dan Glickman for the proposition that “[g]rowing pest-resistant crops 
would alleviate world hunger, reduce pesticide damage to the environment, and save rain forests from 
being cleared for food production”). 
 4. Graham Brooks & Peter Barfoot, GM Crops: global socio-economic and environmental 
impacts 1996–2010, 32–34, 80–82 (May 2012), http://www.pgeconomics.co.uk/page/33/global-impact-
2012.  
 5. Id.; See also Biotechnology, MONSANTO, http://www.monsantoafrica.com/biotechnology/ 
default.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (asserting that “other innovations” can contribute to decreased 
use of pesticides).  
 6. Brooks and Barfoot, supra note 4, at 83–88. 
         7.   See Biofortified rice as a contribution to the alleviation of life-threatening micronutrient 
deficiencies in developing countries, THE GOLDEN RICE PROJECT, http://www.goldenrice.org/index.php 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2013) (“The shocking fact is that . . . more than 10 million children under the age 
of five are dying every year. A high proportion of those children die victim of common diseases that 
could be prevented through a better nutrition. This number has been equated with a ‘Nutritional 
Holocaust.’ It is unfortunate that the world is not embracing more readily a number of approaches with 
the potential to substantially reduce the number of deaths. It has been calculated that the life of 25 
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the hungry masses rather than confront their fears of science and change.8 
And indeed, those charges are an integral part of the public discussion of 
agricultural biotechnology—sometimes made explicit, other times sub rosa.  
 Had biotech crops unambiguously delivered on its promoters’ 
extravagant promises, this indictment would indeed be a serious one. 
However, after nearly two decades of experience with these crops, it is not 
altogether clear that these claims are valid. Despite overwhelming adoption 
of genetically engineered (GE) corn, soybeans, and cotton, crop yields have 
largely held steady or decreased,9 while pesticide use has skyrocketed.10 As 
a result, at least ten species of so-called “superweeds”—weed plants 
resistant to glyphosate—have been documented in more than twenty 
states.11 Worse, the problem of food insecurity has increased rather than 
decreased—leaving more people hungry than at any other point in human 
history.12 Many policymakers nevertheless insist that biotech crops are the 
future of global agriculture, and that these crops will ultimately deliver on 
the promises made from the very beginning.13  
                                                                                                                 
percent of those children could be spared by providing them with diets that included crops biofortified 
with provitamin A (beta-carotene) and zinc”). 
 8. See, e.g., ROBERT PAARLBERG, STARVED FOR SCIENCE 1 (2008) (arguing that while it costs 
rich countries nothing to drive out biotechnology through regulation, driving out biotechnology from 
poor countries impacts their farm-production and food-consumption needs). Norman Borlaug, Nobel 
Laureate and “Father” of Green Revolution, was widely quoted as characterizing biotechnology 
opponents as “[e]xtremists in the environmental movement, largely from rich nations . . . [that] seem to 
be doing everything they can to stop scientific progress in its tracks.” Norman E. Borlaug, Ending World 
Hunger. The Promise of Biotechnology and the Threat of Antiscience Zealotry, 124 PLANT PHYSIOL. 
487, 488 (2000), available at http://www.plantphysiol.org/content/124/2/487.full. 
 9. DOUG CURIAN-SHERMAN, Failure to Yield: Evaluating the Performance of Genetically 
Engineered Crops, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS ,13 (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/food_and_agriculture/failure-to-yield.pdf; B.L. Ma & K. D. 
Subedi, Development, yield, grain moisture and nitrogen uptake of Bt corn hybrids and their 
conventional near-isolines, 93 FIELD CROPS RESS 199, 200, 209 (2005), 
http://www.saveourseeds.org/downloads/Btmaize_inferior_yield.pdf. 
        10. See Charles Benbrook, Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on Pesticide Use in the 
US—the First Sixteen Years, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES EUROPE, 24:24, at 1 (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.enveurope.com/content/pdf/2190-4715-24-24.pdf (finding that pesticide use has increased 
by approximately 404 million pounds or 7 percent).  
 11. William Newman & Andrew Pollack, Farmers Cope With Roundup Resistant Weeds, N.Y. 
TIMES, BI, May 3, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/business/energy-
environment/04weed.html?pagewanted=print. Indeed, Bayer Cropscience’s most pitch for its genetically 
engineered cotton begins with the following phrase: “With weed resistance exploding across America’s 
farmland.” Bayer CropScience, Stoneville Offers Two New Varieties With GlyTol and LibertyLink 
Traits, (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.bayercropscience.us/news/product-news?storyId=0CB58C47-BE79-
4A2C-9979-162CE57A055D.  
 12. Rebecca Bratspies, Food, Technology and Hunger, 8 LAW CULTURE & THE HUMAN. 1, 7 
(Oct. 1, 2012), available at http://lch.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/09/24/1743872112456990.  
 13. For example, Ismail Serageldin CGIAR Chief and World Bank Vice-President 
characterized biotechnology as “a crucial part of expanding agricultural productivity in the 21st 
century.” While he viewed biotechnology as “a tremendous help in meeting the challenge of feeding an 
additional three billion human beings, 95% of them in the poor developing countries, on the same 
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 Even assuming for purposes of discussion that agricultural 
biotechnology can ultimately be able to live up to a portion of its 
extravagant billing, these public advantages will only be realized with a 
comprehensive and scientifically rigorous regulatory system that ensures 
environmental and human health issues are addressed in a transparent and 
credible fashion. To our detriment, we currently do not have such a system. 
As a result the United States is in the process of reaping a harvest of 
environmental harms associated with uncontrolled planting of GE crops, 
including: contamination of conventional and organic crops; an explosion 
of herbicide-resistant weeds; and a massive overall increase in herbicide 
use. The impact of these broad-based concerns, and the lack of regulatory 
attention they attract ought to give one pause when considering how 
thoroughly these crops are regulated.  
 The companies involved in developing and marketing transgenic 
agricultural crops take the position that regulation is stringent and 
omnipresent in their industry. For example, Aventis CropScience claimed 
that “[a]ll of our products, including those based on biotechnology, undergo 
thorough human, animal, and environmental safety evaluations. In order to 
be released commercially, they have to obtain the respective regulatory 
authorization. This involves rigorous governmental safety reviews and 
approval processes.”14 The assertion that “[e]xtensive testing and a long 
approval process accompany every GM crop introduction”15 is routinely 
offered as an antidote to doubt about the wisdom of approving these crops, 
as is the proposition that “[i]n the United States, three agencies regulate 
these crops.”16 The agencies are not far behind. The United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) claims to employ “a science-based 
regulatory system” that “allows for the safe development and use of 
agricultural goods derived from new technologies that provide increased 
production options to agricultural producers.”17 Indeed more than a decade 
                                                                                                                 
amount of land and water currently available,” he also recognized that for this to occur, the technology 
must first be “safely deployed.”  
 14. Should We Grow GM Crops?, article to special report Harvest of Fear, PBS, quoted in PBS 
Harvest of Fear, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/harvest/exist/no6.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). Bayer now owns this portion of Aventis. Bayer: A History, 
Gmwarh.org/gm-paper/11153-bayer-a-history.  
  15. Pocket K No. 11: Contribution of GM Technology to the Livestock Sector, INT’L SERV. FOR 
THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/ 
pocketk/11/default.asp (last updated 2006); SAN DIEGO CTR. FOR MOLECULAR AGRIC., FOOD FROM 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 10, http://www.brown.edu/ce/adult/arise/resources/docs/ 
gmfoodbrochure.pdf.  
 16. SAN DIEGO CTR. FOR MOLECULAR AGRIC., supra note 15, at 4.  
 17. USDA, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2015 23, http://www.ocfo.usda.gov/usdasp/sp2010/ 
sp2010.pdf.  
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ago, former USDA Secretary Dan Glickman asserted, “[t]est after rigorous 
scientific test has proven these products to be safe.”18 
 These claims of rigorous regulation are not borne out in practice. The 
United States does not have a comprehensive regulatory scheme that 
considers all of the likely risks associated with GE crops prior to approval 
or, for that matter, on an on-going basis. Numerous reasons exist to bring 
more rigorous regulatory scrutiny to GE organisms. This Article highlights 
how, in the absence of such a regulatory scheme, critical risks associated 
with these cracks escape regulatory scrutiny. The end result is that private 
actors, motivated by short-term interests, are able to engage in conduct that 
imposes risks on wider society without any democratic consideration of the 
acceptability of those risks.19 To be clear, this is an indictment of the 
decision-making process itself rather than a comment about particular 
regulatory outcomes. The objection is not so much to the exact contours of 
the ultimate decisions about these crops, but to the lack of democratic 
legitimacy in a regulatory structure that systematically transfers the power 
to make what should be public decisions—involving public participation 
and based on public interests—to private actors, motivated by private 
interests. Long experience has shown that in the absence of a transparent 
regulatory process, which forces a public weighing of costs and benefits, 
such private risk-benefit analyses too often disregard important public 
values and interests. Thus, this Article focuses on the kind of regulatory 
system necessary for appropriate decision-making and the kind of system 
that will build public confidence in biotechnology.  
 It is no secret that protecting the public’s interest in this context 
requires the government to assume a far more active role than the hands-off 
attitude that has been the hallmark of conventional agricultural policy. To 
that end, this Article argues that the United States needs an effective 
regulatory system for  GE crops—one that is not only comprehensive and 
scientifically rigorous, but also transparent and credible to the public it is 
intended to protect and benefit. To make the case that we do not currently 
have such a regulatory system, Section I of this Article begins with a brief 
historical overview of how we arrived at this juncture in the first place—
identifying some key technological breakthroughs and regulatory decisions. 
Section II then lays out the current United States regulatory system for 
transgenic crops, detailing the patchwork of statutes and agencies pressed 
into service. Section III highlights some key considerations that routinely 
fall through the gaps in our current patchworked regulatory system. Section 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Maggie Urry, supra note 3 (quotations omitted).  
 19. See Serageldin, supra note 1 (referencing this transition to private research and 
decisionmaking). 
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IV concludes with some thoughts on how this regulatory situation impacts 
broader democratic legitimacy questions.  
I. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
 The United States current regulatory system for biotechnology dates 
back to the Reagan Administration. It emerged not from careful, proactive 
government decision making, but in response to a lawsuit brought against 
the federal government over the first field trials of a genetically modified 
organism. After Watson and Crick discovered the structure of DNA in 
1953, molecular genetic research exploded. By the early 1970s, academic 
researchers had developed the capacity to transfer genes from one organism 
to another, and to create recombinant DNA molecules. The prospects for 
this new technology were both exciting and frightening. Prompted by a 
concern that the speed of technology’s advance had outpaced any controls, 
one-hundred-fifty scientists from around the world gathered at the Asilomar 
Conference Center in Pine Grove, California to hammer out a set of safety 
precautions for genetic research.20 Known as the Asilomar Consensus 
Statement,21 the conference recommended a series of guidelines for genetic 
engineering research. This consensus formed the basis for the Recombinant 
DNA Research Guidelines issued by the National Institute of Health (NIH) 
in 1976.22 
  The first real challenge to these guidelines came soon afterwards. In 
1983, a California company applied for permission to field test a GE 
bacterium called “Ice-minus.”23 In its conventional, unmodified form, this 
bacteria was responsible for causing frost damage to plants.24 A researcher 
at University of California–Berkeley modified the bacteria so that it no 
longer promoted the ice crystal formation that damages plants as frost.25 
The idea was that by replacing the common bacteria with the GE “Ice-
minus” bacteria, plants would be better able to resist frost damage.26  
                                                                                                                 
 20. For a discussion of the Asilomar Conference and its consequences, see Rebecca M. 
Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 371, 378–79 (2004). 
 21. ASSEMBLY OF LIFE SCI., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE ASILOMAR 
CONFERENCE ON RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES (1975), http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/QQ/B/C/G/D/ 
/qqbcgd.pdf.  
 22. Charles Weiner, Is Self-Regulation Enough Today? Evaluating the Recombinant DNA 
Controversy, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 289, 293–98 (1999) (providing history of Recombinant DNA self-
regulation).  
23.  See generally SHELDON KRIMSKY & ALONZO PLOUGH, ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: 
COMMUNCATING RISKS AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 75 (1988) (providing an account of the “Ice-minus” 
controversy). 
 24.  Id. at 78. 
        25.  Id. at 77–78.   
 26. Id. at 75. 
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 After successful greenhouse testing, the developer applied for 
permission to field-test the “Ice-minus” bacteria by spraying it on potato, 
tomato, and bean plants.27 The NIH, which at the time was the only federal 
agency exercising any regulatory authority over biotechnology, approved 
the field trials through its Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee.28 
Jeremy Rivkin and the Foundation on Economic Trends (FET) sued in 
federal court, arguing that the NIH had violated the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) by approving the release without conducting an 
Environmental Impact Assessment.29 In a landmark decision by Judge 
Skelley Wright, the D.C. Circuit issued an injunction prohibiting NIH from 
approving the field trial until it considered the “broad[er] environmental 
issues attendant on deliberate release” of genetically modified organisms.30 
Striking on themes that continue to haunt regulation of genetically modified 
organisms, the court “emphatically” concluded that NIH had failed to 
“display[] . . . rigorous attention to environmental concerns.”31 In particular, 
the court found that NIH had completely failed to consider “the possibility 
of various environmental effects”—identifying as the most “glaring 
deficiency” NIH’s failure to consider the effects of dispersal of the 
genetically modified organisms.32 
 This successful legal challenge forced the Reagan Administration to 
develop a more overarching regulatory policy to guide federal decision-
making about biotechnology research and its products. To that end, in 1984 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy proposed the Coordinated 
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, which was finalized in 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. at 90–91. 
 28. Recombinant DNA Research; Actions Under Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,548, 24,548–52. 
(June 1, 1983). 
 29. Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler (I), 587 F. Supp. 753, 757 (D.D.C. 1984) [hereinafter 
Heckler I], aff’d in part & vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). For a detailed discussion of 
this case, see Elizabeth Pizzulli, Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler: Genetic Engineering and 
NEPA’s EIS Requirement, 2 PACE ENVT’L L. REV. 138, 138–139 (1984). 
 30. Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler (II), 756 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter 
Heckler II]. At the time, very little was known about the ramifications of this technology. EPA had 
already concluded that the Ice-minus bacteria would likely escape the test plot and persist indefinitely in 
the environment. Indeed, in an unusually frank contemporaneous comment, a researcher commented 
“You remember the space program, when all those rockets were blowing up on the launching pad? Well, 
the science (of gene-splicing) is at that stage now." See Andrew Maykuth, Genetic Wonders to Come: 
Some See Boon, Others Calamity, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 10, 1986), http://www.maykuth.com/Archives/ 
gene86.htm (quoting William R. Harvey, then a researcher at Temple University). 
 31. Heckler II, 756 F.2d at 146.  
 32. Id. at 153–54. After the Foundation on Economic Trends lawsuit, EPA reviewed and 
ultimately approved the proposed “Ice-minus” field tests. Local protests continued to hinder the 
experiments, as municipalities and citizens groups objected to having the test plots in their communities. 
The company did not help its cause—during the pendency of the proceeding, they illegally applied 
recombinant insects to trees on a rooftop patio at its Oakland headquarters. The field tests ultimately 
took place in 1987 amidst a media storm.  
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1986.33 From its inception, the Coordinated Framework’s drafters made it 
clear that their primary goal was addressing industry needs for “sensible” 
regulation that would not stifle innovation,34 rather than responding to a 
public desire for rigorous regulation to protect public safety. Thus, the 
resulting Coordinated Framework emphasized the United States’ 
commitment to reducing trade barriers in biotechnology.35 A comparable 
degree of commitment to preserving environmental safety was less evident.  
 With virtually no modifications in the intervening decades, this 
Coordinated Framework continues to govern regulatory decisions about 
agricultural biotechnology. The central assumption guiding the Coordinated 
Framework is “substantial equivalence,”36 which is the assessment that the 
products of genetic engineering are functionally equivalent to their 
unmodified counterparts and should be treated accordingly.37 This starting 
point led the United States to develop a regulatory system built on four key 
principles:  
 
[1] biotechnology poses no unique risks; [2] the products of 
biotechnology should be regulated, not the process; [3] existing 
laws should be used to regulate the products of biotechnology (no 
new legislation was needed); and [4] any gaps should be 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 
26,1986).  
  34. The proposal provided in relevant part:  
The Working Group recognizes the need for a coordinated and sensible regulatory 
review process that will minimize the uncertainties and inefficiencies that can 
stifle innovation and impair the competitiveness of U.S. industry. . . . The 
importance of addressing the emerging commercial aspects of biotechnology in a 
coordinated and timely fashion is captured in the recent report by the 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment which warned: ‘Although the 
United States is currently the world leader in both basic science and commercial 
development of new biotechnology, continuation of the initial preeminence of 
American companies in the commercialization of new biotechnology is not 
assured.  
Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. 
50,856, 50,857 (proposed Dec. 31, 1984). Indeed, responding to the political and economic 
climate characterized by a general anxiety that the United States was losing its competitive 
edge, the Reagan Administration sent a clear message that “regulatory agencies were not to 
stand in the way of biotechnology.” Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty. Complexity 
and Change: An Eco-Pragmatic Reinvention of First Generation Environmental Law, 33 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 105, 171 n. 328 (2006). 
 35. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,308. 
 36. See generally Jan-Peter Nap et al., The Release of Genetically Modified Crops into the 
Environment, 33 PLANT J. 1, 9 (2003); See also Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 20, at 390 
(discussing the problems that arise with the United States lack of a comprehensive statute addressing 
genetically engineered products and the division of regulation among various agencies). 
 37.  Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Regulating Genetically 
Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 406 (2007).  
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addressed through coordination among agencies and designation 
of lead agencies as appropriate.38 
 
 A key consequence of this approach is that the United States did not 
adopt any new laws directly targeting regulation of this new technology. 
That means there is no unified statutory authority for regulating these crops, 
and no regulator with an unambiguous regulatory mandate. Instead of one 
single federal agency charged with comprehensively governing the 
regulation of GE crops, regulatory responsibility was spread across three 
different federal agencies, with three very different mandates. These federal 
agencies pressed into service a patchwork of statutes, all of which predated 
the advent of this technology, in order to cobble together some kind of 
regulatory system. The resulting system divides up regulatory authority in 
ways that do not particularly make sense and leave some key risks 
unregulated.  
 The three decades since the “Ice-Minus” debacle have seen a dramatic 
growth of regulatory apparatuses and a dramatic increase in the agencies’ 
decision making about GE organisms. Yet, if we look at the questions that 
still do not fit neatly into the regulatory process, we find that they are 
precisely the same kinds of issues that prompted an injunction in 1983. 
There are three categories of risk that this cobbled-together regulatory 
scheme is particularly poor at addressing: systemic environmental risks, 
food safety risks, and risks of social and economic disruption flowing from 
unresolved liability and property issues.  
II. THE AGENCIES AND THEIR REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
 Before turning to some recent disputes that highlight the regulatory 
gaps identified above, it is worthwhile to first lay out the relative regulatory 
roles the Coordinated Framework assigned to the USDA, Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—
the main actors in this regulatory space.39 Thus, the next three subsections 
offer a thumbnail sketch of the agencies and their primary roles under the 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id.  
 39. I have elsewhere explored these regulatory roles in some detail. Interested readers are 
encouraged to seek out those earlier works. For an in-depth discussion of EPA’s role in regulating Bt 
crops, see Rebecca M. Bratspies, The Illusion of Care Regulation: Uncertainty and Genetically Modified 
Food Crops, 10 NYU ENVT’L L. J. 297, 314–16 (2002) (arguing that deficiencies exist in EPA’s 
regulation due to statutory inadequacies); for information about FDA’s regulatory role, see Rebecca M. 
Bratspies, Glowing in the Dark: How America’s First Transgenic Animal Escaped Regulation, 6 MINN. 
J. L. SCI. & TECH. 457, 471–72 (2005) (describing FDA’s failure to regulate transgenic fish); and for an 
explanation of USDA-APHIS’s role, see Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 20, at 390 (discussing 
the USDA’s authority to regulate genetically engineered organisms).   
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Coordinated Framework. The short version is that the USDA, EPA, and 
FDA divide up regulatory authority based on their pre-existing statutory 
authorities. At least ten different laws and numerous agency regulations and 
guidelines are pressed into service to regulate GE plants, animals, and 
microorganisms. Each of these laws predates the advent of biotechnology, 
and they reflect widely different regulatory approaches and procedures.  
 In theory, this division of labor means that the EPA evaluates whether 
a GE plant is safe for the environment,40 the USDA evaluates whether the 
plant is safe to grow,41 and the FDA evaluates whether the plant is safe to 
eat.42 In practice, that distinction rapidly breaks down because of the 
artificialities introduced by the need to rely on pre-existing statutory 
authority. Statutes written well before the advent of genetic engineering do 
not map perfectly onto the issues raised by this new technology. The result 
is an odd series of overlaps and gaps. For example, the EPA is responsible 
for testing and regulating GE plants that endogenously produce pesticides, 
like Bt corn, but not those that are modified nutritionally or for increased 
herbicide tolerance or disease resistance.43 The USDA has a wider scope in 
terms of GE organisms within its regulatory ken, but its focus is exclusively 
on whether those novel plants pose a plant pest risk.44 The FDA nominally 
regulates food safety but limits its inquiry by beginning with the assumption 
that GE foods are substantially equivalent to non-modified versions of the 
same food.45 In general, exactly what the FDA regulates with regards to GE 
foods is uncertain and confusing.46 
A. USDA Regulatory Authority 
 The USDA-Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) uses the 
Plant Protection Act to regulate the introduction of GE crops.47 This statute 
                                                                                                                 
        40.  See Bratspies, Illusion of Care Regulation, supra note 39, at 314 (noting that under FIFRA, 
EPA has the primary responsibility of environmental protection from biotechnology).  
        41.  Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 20, at 390.  
        42.  See Bratspies, Glowing in the Dark, supra note 39, at 473 (describing the FDA’s regulatory 
role).  
        43.  Bratspies, The Illusion of Care Regulation, supra note 39, at 316.  
        44.  See Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn, supra note 20, at 391 (discussing the 
constraints and conflicts within the USDA’s regulation of genetically modified plants). 
        45.  See Bratspies, Glowing in the Dark, supra note 39, at 487 (explaining the FDA’s 
assumptions in the regulatory scheme). 
        46.  Id. at 43 (discussing FDA’s inadequate and unclear regulations of transgenic fish). 
       47.  See Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7712(a) (2006) (granting USDA authority to regulate 
“any plant, plant product, biological control organism, noxious weed, article, or means of 
conveyance . . . that the prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent the introduction into the United 
States or the dissemination of a plant pest or noxious weed within the United States”).  
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gives the USDA authority to regulate movement of organisms that may 
endanger plant life.48 But, because the Plant Protection Act is a quarantine 
statute intended to prevent the introduction and transmission of plant pests, 
the USDA’s primary duty is to evaluate whether there is a risk that an 
organism will pose a plant pest risk when introduced into the environment, 
or interstate commerce.49 Indeed, the USDA touts this evaluation as 
evidence that the United States engages in a science-based regulatory 
strategy.50  
 Many GE plants use Agrobacterium, a known plant pest, as the 
mechanism for transformation. As a result, these plants fall under the 
USDA-APHIS’s Plant Protection Act authority. However, plants 
transformed by use of a gene gun do not fall within the agency’s 
authority—leaving the introduction of those plants wholly unregulated 
unless they happen to fall within the EPA’s narrow regulatory ambit, which 
is discussed below. Even for plants transformed by Agrobacterium, and 
therefore under the USDA-APHIS’s authority, a plant pest analysis does not 
capture many of the most likely risks posed by these crops. The statute’s 
implementing regulations defines a plant pest as:  
 
[A]ny living stage . . . of insects, mites, nematodes, slugs, snails, 
protozoa, or other invertebrate animals, bacteria, fungi, other 
parasitic plants or reproductive parts thereof; viruses; or any 
organisms similar to or allied with any of the foregoing . . . [that] 
directly or indirectly injure[s] or cause[s] disease or damage to 
[a] plant.51  
 
 Under section 7711(a) of the Plant Protection Act, the Secretary of 
Agriculture may issue regulations “to prevent the introduction of plant pests 
into the United States or the dissemination of plant pests within the United 
States.”52 The Secretary has delegated this authority to APHIS, which has 
drafted regulations to regulate “organisms and products altered or produced 
through genetic engineering that are plant pests or are believed to be plant 
pests.”53 These regulations give APHIS the authority to regulate GE 
organisms and products if the genetic engineering involves use of an 
                                                                                                                 
        48. Id.  
 49.  Id. at § 7712(c).  
 50. In its strategic plan, USDA touts the fact that “before a genetically engineered crop can be 
commercialized, the Department evaluates it thoroughly to ensure that it does not pose a plant-pest risk. 
This process ensures safe introduction and agricultural production options and enhances public and 
international confidence in these products.” STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2015, supra note 17, 23.  
 51. 7 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2012). 
 52. 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a). 
 53. 7 C.F.R. § 340.0(a)(2), n. 1.  
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organism that is considered a plant pest and APHIS has reason to believe 
that the GE organism may be a plant pest, or if APHIS does not have 
information to determine if the GE organism is unlikely to pose a plant pest 
risk. 54 
 Pursuant to this authority, APHIS regulates “organisms and products 
altered or produced through genetic engineering that are plant pests or are 
believed to be plant pests.”55 The statute might authorize APHIS to exercise 
broad regulatory authority because it defines plant pest as “any 
[microorganism] . . . that can directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to, 
or cause disease in any plant or plant product.”56 The USDA interprets this 
authority narrowly, treating GE crops exactly like their conventional 
counterparts and evaluating them for the same risks.  
 GE crops pose many risks for which there is no ready conventional 
plant pest parallel. Yet, because it interprets its regulatory authority as 
limited solely to plant pest considerations, the USDA-APHIS brackets 
many of the clear risks associated with these crops. The bracketed risks 
include: the likelihood of excessive herbicide application with the 
accompanying evolution of weed resistance;57 contamination of 
conventional crops from pollen drift or pollinator activity;58 and the impact 
on domestic and global trade that flows from cross-fertilization, cross-
contamination, or co-mingling conventional—or organic—and GE crops.59 
This latter omission is particularly perverse given that the USDA identifies 
“facilitating access to international markets” and “supporting the 
development of new domestic markets,” particularly organics, as key tasks 
for achieving its self-declared goal of “ensuring a financially sustainable 
and competitive national agricultural system.”60  
There is no reason for the USDA to limit its consideration of GE crops 
in this fashion. The Plant Protection Act gives the USDA broad authority to 
regulate “plant pests.” The Act gives the agency even broader authority to 
regulate “noxious weeds,” which are defined as “any plant or plant product 
that can directly or indirectly injure or cause damage to crops . . . or other 
interests of agriculture . . . the natural resources of the United States, the 
public health, or the environment.”61  
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. §§ 340.0(a)(2); 340.2(a). 
 55. Id. § 340.0(a)(2), n. 1. 
 56. 7 U.S.C. § 7702(14).  
 57. See discussion, infra Part III A. 
 58. See discussion, infra Part III B.  
 59. Id. 
 60. STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 17, at 8.  
 61.  7 U.S.C. § 7702(10). 
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Under the Plant Protection Act, the APHIS has the authority to prohibit 
or restrict the movement in interstate commerce of any plant in order to 
prevent the introduction or dissemination of a plant pest or noxious weed.62 
Moreover, any plant may “be subject to remedial measures the Secretary 
determines to be necessary to prevent the spread of plant pests or noxious 
weeds.”63 Because Congress gave the agency broad authority to prevent 
noxious weed growth by restricting “any plant,”64 APHIS need not limit 
itself to the narrow inquiry of evaluating GE crops for the same harms 
associated with traditional noxious weeds.  
It should not be surprising that the agronomic and environmental risks 
of harm associated with GE crops are novel. There is no reason, other than 
internal agency culture, that APHIS does not consider transgenic 
contamination of conventional crops or the proliferation of superweeds 
from overuse of glyphosate to be issues that “directly or indirectly injure or 
cause damage to . . . . agriculture, . . . the natural resources of the United 
States, the public health, or the environment.”65  
 Not only does the agency conceive of its regulatory authority too 
narrowly, it also fails to rigorously enforce the regulations it does apply. 
Specifically, the Plant Protection Act’s implementing regulations make it 
unlawful for any person to introduce without a permit any organism that has 
been GE from one or more enumerated organisms that are considered plant 
pests.66 Anyone may petition APHIS to deregulate a GE crop.67 Before a 
GE crop may be deregulated, APHIS must review an applicant’s 
deregulation petition and make a determination that the particular GE crop 
does not present a plant pest risk and should not be regulated.68  
 If APHIS decides that a GE organism poses no greater plant pest risk 
than an equivalent non-GE organism, it will approve a petition for non-
regulated status. At that point, APHIS claims to have no further regulatory 
authority, and the agency ceases to monitor or regulate the environmental 
release and movement of the crop.69 This means that deregulated genetically 
engineered organisms may be planted anywhere in the United States with 
no further regulatory oversight. Two recent lawsuits successfully 
challenged the environmental assessments APHIS prepared before deciding 
                                                                                                                 
62.  Id. §7712(a). 
63.  Id. §7712(c)(3). 
64.  Id. § 7712(a).  
65.  Id. § 7702(10).  
66. 7 C.F.R. § 340.2(a). 
67.  Id. § 340.6(a).  
68. Id. § 340.6(d)–(e). 
69.  Id. § 340.6(e)(1).  
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to deregulate two Roundup Ready crops as cursory and wholly 
inadequate.70  
B. The EPA’s Regulatory Authority 
 The USDA is not alone in having its hands tied by an unduly narrow 
and inadequate statutory mandate. The EPA is probably the most logical 
regulator to consider environmental impacts of GE crops. Yet, the agency’s 
regulatory authority over these crops is actually extremely limited. Indeed, 
the EPA’s regulatory authority over these crops flows wholly from the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which gives the 
agency control over a narrow slice of GE crops. Under FIFRA, the EPA 
regulates microorganisms, herbicides, and pesticides.71 With few 
exceptions, no person may sell or distribute a pesticide that is not registered 
under FIFRA.72 Under FIFRA, the EPA “shall register a pesticide if . . . it 
will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects to 
the environment; and when used in accordance with widespread and 
commonly recognized practice, it will not generally cause unreasonable 
adverse effects on the environment.”73 Unreasonable adverse effects are 
defined as “any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into 
account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of use 
of any pesticide.”74  
 For GE crops that endogenously produce pesticides, Bt crops, the EPA 
has some reasonable regulatory tools available. The EPA has identified the 
evolution of resistance to Bt as an adverse environmental impact under 
FIFRA.75 To prevent (or delay) this evolution, the EPA imposed planting 
restrictions as part of the pesticide registration for Bt crops.76 The goal of 
these restrictions is to preserve effectiveness of Bt by maintaining insect 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227, at *9 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 21, 2009); Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624, at *12 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007), aff’d, 570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds 
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. 2473 (2010).  
 71.  7 U.S.C. § 136a(a); Id. § 136(t)–(v) (defining pests, pesticides, and plant regulators). 
 72. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a). The pesticide regulations are set out in 40 C.F.R. Parts 150–189. 
 73. Id. § 136a(c)(5)(C)–(c)(5)(D). 
 74. Id. § 136(bb)(1). 
 75. OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BIOPESTICIDES REGISTRATION 
ACTION DOCUMENT: BACILLUS THURINGIENSIS (BT) PLANT-INCORPORATED PROTECTANTS IID2 (2001), 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/pips/bt_brad2/4-irm.pdf. 
 76. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RESPONSE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY TO 
PETITION FOR RULEMAKING AND COLLATERAL RELIEF CONCERNING THE REGISTRATION AND USE OF 
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PLANTS EXPRESSING BACILLIUS THURINGIENSIS ENDOTOXINS 8 (2000), 
http://www.epa.gov/oppbppd1/biopesticides/pips/greenpeace-petition.pdf.  
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vulnerability to the pesticide.77 The cornerstone of this plan was a high-
dose/structured refuge strategy.78 Under this strategy, every Bt planting 
must be accompanied by a refuge zone—a planting of non-Bt crops not 
sprayed with Bt foliar spray.79 For this strategy to work, three critical 
conditions that must be met: the GE Bt plants’ tissue must be very toxic to 
kill all individuals heterozygous for resistance; resistance alleles must be 
sufficiently rare that nearly all alleles will be in heterozygotes susceptible to 
the very toxic plants; and refuges must be planted to maximize the 
probability that any resistant homozygote insect will mate with susceptible 
homozygote insect, thus producing heterozygous progeny that cannot 
survive the toxicity of the crop.80  
 This all seems very scientific and at first glance might support industry 
contentions that regulation of GE crops is both rigorous and science-based. 
Yet, when the EPA first registered Bt crops in 1996, and when it re-
registered them in 2001, the agency had no information from which to 
conclude that any of these conditions were actually being met.81 Some GE 
crops were approved despite not producing a particularly high dose of the 
Bt toxins.82 Bt crops were approved without an estimate of resistance allele 
frequency and required in-field sampling techniques were inadequate to 
catch resistance before it had taken hold.83 Most disturbingly, Bt crops were 
approved without a refuge requirement.84 Only when it became graphically 
clear that the EPA’s initial planting estimates and assumptions about 
voluntary compliance were wrong did the EPA use its regulatory authority 
to mandate refuges.85 Even then, the agency imposed a refuge requirement 
less stringent than virtually every scientific estimate of adequacy, and the 
agency also permitted growers to spray these refuges with pesticides if crop 
damage exceeded an economic loss threshold.86 While any or all of these 
                                                                                                                 
 77.   Id. at 9.  
 78.   Id.  
 79.   Id.  
 80.  Id.  
        81. For an in-depth discussion of this point, see Bratspies, The Illusion of Care Regulation, 
supra note 39, at 330–31 (arguing that in light of the available scientific evidence, EPA’s approval of 
non-high dose Bt hybrids was unreasonable); see also, Rebecca M. Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary 
Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 WM & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL. REV. 593, 615 
(2003).  
 82. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 76, at 9. Bratspies, The Illusion of Care Regulation, 
supra note 43, at 329–30. 
 83. Bratspies, Illusion of Care, supra note 39, at 331–32. 
 84. Id. at 333–34. 
 85. Id. at 337. 
 86. Id. at 339–40.  
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regulatory choices may be good policy from a grower-economics 
perspective, not one of them is about science. 
 Moreover, even given the limited rigor of the refuge requirement, 
major questions remain about compliance and enforcement. Because the 
EPA does not regulate the crop itself, but only the pesticide produced by the 
plant, it has no ability to require reporting of where Bt crops are planted. 
This lack of relevant authority makes enforcement next to impossible. 
Reports suggest that the planting distances are routinely ignored.87  
C. The FDA’s Regulatory Authority 
 The FDA is perhaps the most limited of the three agencies with regard 
to GE crops, even though that limitation is wholly self-imposed. The 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) prohibits “the 
introduction . . . into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or 
cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.”88 A food is “adulterated” if it 
bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance.89 Substances that 
are added to food fall into two possible categories: food additives and 
substances that are “generally recognized as safe” or GRAS.90 The statutory 
definition of food additive is “any substance . . . [that] may reasonably be 
expected to . . . becom[e] a component or otherwise affect[] the 
characteristics of any food” unless the substance is generally recognized as 
safe (GRAS) for its intended use by scientific experts.91  
 Food additives require premarket review and approval by the FDA as 
“safe,” which is defined as “reasonable certainty in the minds of competent 
scientists that the substance is not harmful under the intended conditions of 
use.”92 If a food additive is deemed unsafe, the food containing the additive 
is deemed adulterated.93 Moreover, a food additive is deemed to be unsafe 
unless used in conformity with a regulation specifying the conditions under 
which the additive may be safely used.94 If the substance added to food, 
however, is “generally recognized as safe,” then it is not considered a food 
additive for purposes of the FFDCA and no prior FDA approval is 
required.95  
                                                                                                                 
        87.   Id. at 343. 
 88. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). 
 89. Id. § 342(a)(1).  
        90.   Id. § 321(s).  
 91. Id. § 321(s). 
 92. 21 C.F.R. §170.30(i). 
 93. 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), 342(a)(1), 342(a)(2)(C). 
 94. Id. § 348(a)(2).  
 95. Id. § 321(s); 21 C.F.R. § 170.30. 
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 The definition of food additive is clearly broad enough to encompass 
GE foods. Thus, the FDA might have used its authority to rigorously 
regulate GE crops under its food additive authority by requiring premarket 
approval of the introduced genetic material they contain and the proteins 
that genetic material produces. However, building on the “substantial 
equivalence” mindset of the Coordinated Framework, the FDA concluded 
that GE crops are presumptively GRAS.96 The consequences of this 
decision are monumental—a GRAS determination means that these 
products are exempted from the FDA’s food safety regulations. The FDA’s 
GRAS presumption for GE foods was upheld in Alliance for Bio-Integrity 
v. Shalala.97 
 FDA regulations do permit those developing GE foods—mostly ag-
biotech companies like Monsanto—to voluntarily consult with the FDA 
before marketing a new GE food product.98 The company’s obligation is to 
satisfy itself that its product is safe rather than to prove safety to the FDA.99 
This leads to a developer-driven consultation process in which the 
proponent of a new GE food decides what safety tests to conduct, and what 
data to submit to the FDA. The FDA reviews only the data that is 
voluntarily submitted by the company, and imposes no obligation on the 
developer to share all its data, including negative or inconclusive results 
with the agency.100 The FDA conducts no independent testing of these food 
products.101 Thus, the highly touted FDA premarket approval amounts to 
the FDA reviewing GRAS determination made by private manufacturers 
based on a select subset of supporting data that the manufacturers 
voluntarily submit for review. 
 Not only is there no requirement that GE food developers consult with 
the FDA, those companies are also not required to follow any 
                                                                                                                 
   96.   Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,990 
(May 29, 1992).  
 97. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (D.D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 98. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, supra note 99, at 22,991. In 
2001, FDA proposed regulations that would have changed this regulatory stance significantly. Proposed 
Rule: Pre-market Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,706, 4,706 (Jan. 18, 2001) (to 
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192 and 592). Under the proposed rules, FDA would have required 
submission of data and information about plant-derived bioengineered foods or animal feeds at least 120 
days prior to commercial distribution. This mandatory process would have replaced voluntary 
consultations, and would have required the agency, not industry to make the GRAS determination in the 
first instance. One of the first acts of the incoming George W. Bush administration was to suspend and 
withdraw these rules for further consideration. They have never been re-introduced. 
 99.  FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE ON CONSULTATION PROCEDURES FOODS DERIVED 
FROM NEW PLANT VARIETIES, (1997), available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/ 
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/Biotechnology/ucm096126.htm.  
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id.  
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recommendations that the FDA makes during or after such a consultation. 
This consultation process, which the FDA itself characterizes as 
“comprehensive scientific review of the data generated by the 
developer,”102 culminates merely in an agency statement that it has “no 
further questions.”103 This no-action letter is the sum total of the agency’s 
involvement—a role rather remote from the industry characterization 
suggesting that the agency actually reviews data and makes a decision that 
the food is safe.  
 This is not a recipe for building public confidence. So, perhaps it is no 
surprise that the public remains ambivalent about the safety of these 
foods,104 and that support for labeling is nearly universal.105 Given the 
rhetoric about “science-based regulation” of GE crops and foods, it is 
important to highlight just how much of the FDA’s “review” of these 
products is actually based on unproven assumptions rather than on actual 
scientific data.  
 Most of the time, food manufacturers have a fairly clear incentive not 
to expose the public to known, unacceptable risks—although we have seen 
some high profile instances of failure, such as the recent peanut butter 
scandal. But, known risks are not the main concern with these novel crops. 
This policy creates little incentive for manufacturers to explore possible 
risks or to develop the kind of information that would enable a full 
assessment of food safety. And, because these food safety decisions are not 
made in a participatory, transparent process, the public has no information 
about how those private actors assessed the acceptability of any risks they 
did uncover. Placing decisions about risk acceptability in the hands of 
private actors with a private stake in the decision creates conflicting 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id.  
 103.  Id.  
 104. INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL, 2012 CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF FOOD 
TECHNOLOGY SURVEY, 3 (2012),  
 http://www.foodinsight.org/Content/5438/FINAL%20Executive%20Summary%205-8-12.pdf. This 
industry funded study reported that only 38% of Americans had a favorable or somewhat favorable 
impression of biotechnology. This result is consistent with other polling. Thompson Reuters reported in 
2010 that 21.4% of Americans believed that genetically-engineered food was safe. THOMPSON 
REUTERS, NATIONAL SURVEY OF HEALTHCARE CONSUMERS: GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOOD (2010), 
http://www.factsforhealthcare.com/pressroom/NPR_report_GeneticEngineeredFood.pdf  
 105. Thompson Reuters reported that 93.1% of Americans supported labeling of genetically 
engineered foods. THOMPSON REUTERS, supra note 104. This result contradicted the International Food 
Information Council survey which reported that 66% of respondents were satisfied with FDA’s current 
regulation of genetically-engineered crops. INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL, supra note 
104, at 3. The difference may be accounted for by the fact that in the Food Council survey, only 30% of 
respondents were aware that foods produced from biotechnology are currently sold in supermarkets 
stores. Id. at 5. In the Thompson Reuters poll, by contrast, 69.2% of respondents knew that genetically-
engineered foods were currently available in supermarkets. THOMPSON REUTERS, supra note 104. 
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interests that can work to the public’s disadvantage. It is precisely these risk 
acceptability determinations that would benefit most from a public airing of 
the risks and benefits associated with a new technology, and the value that 
the public puts on risk avoidance in any given situation.  
 So, when the producers of these crops talk about scientific regulation, 
those representations should be taken with a grain or two of salt. Unpacking 
the regulatory decisions reveals a tremendous amount of uncertainty, and 
extensive policy judgments made in the absence of critical information. To 
fill the gaps, agencies have relied on the Coordinated Framework’s 
directive to promote this technology as a substitute for missing information.  
III.  PROBLEMS THAT FLOW FROM OUR REGULATORY POLICY FOR GMOS  
 In the thirty years since the “Ice-minus” dispute, the United States has 
witnessed a dramatic growth in the development and commercialization of 
GE organisms. Yet if we look at the questions that still do not fit neatly into 
our regulatory process, we find that they are precisely the same issues that 
prompted the D.C. Circuit to issue an injunction in 1983—a lack of 
attention to systemic environmental risks, or the unintended social and 
economic dislocations that accompany this technology.106 Among the 
serious concerns that deserve more rigorous attention from regulators are: 
the increased use of pesticides associated with GE crops and the emergence 
of “superweeds” resistant to pesticides; damage to traditional and organic 
farmers; and the lack of transparency and consumer choice associated with 
a failure to label GE foods.107 Yet the United States tripartite regulatory 
scheme virtually assures that these concerns will continue to fall through 
the cracks.  
 There are some very serious environmental, social, and economic risks 
that the existing regulatory regime is systematically unable to address. 
Among the most notable of the ignored risks are: (1) the cumulative effects 
of multiple GE crops on the evolution of pest resistance due to increased 
herbicide use; (2) gene transfer (also called “gene pollution”) to non-GE 
plants through cross-pollination; and (3) the “consumer right-to-know” and 
“food choice” issues. Indeed, in 2010, the National Academy of Sciences 
identified a series of “information gaps on certain environmental, economic, 
                                                                                                                 
106.  Heckler I, 587 F. Supp. 753, 757 (D.D.C. 1984), aff’d in part & vacated in part, 756 F.2d  
143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 107. There are certainly other risks, including: potential health risks associated with existing or 
likely genetically engineered crops consumed as food; collateral harms to protected species; and an 
overall loss of crop biodiversity and industry consolidation.  
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and social impacts”108 of these crops that made it difficult, if not impossible 
to conduct a full sustainability assessment of GE crops. The next section 
examines how the existing regulatory structure exacerbates these problems.  
A. Spread of “Superweeds”: 
Failure to Consider Cumulative Effects Has Produced Resistance Evolution 
in Response to Rapid Increase of Glyphosate Use 
 Glyphosate-resistant crops109 epitomize many of the greatest regulatory 
challenges posed by GE food crops. These crops involve plants genetically 
engineered to be resistant to the herbicide glyphosate.110 Planted on 69 
million hectares (107.5 million acres) of U.S. farmland in 2011,111 Roundup 
Ready crops are the dominant form of commodity crop planted in the 
United States.112 In 2012, Roundup Ready plantings constituted 88% of the 
corn crop, 94% of the cotton crop, and 93% of the soybean crop.113 In 2011, 
Roundup Ready crops constituted 95% of the sugar beet crop.114 This last 
statistic is particularly interesting because the crop did not have the 
necessary regulatory approvals.115 Indeed the saga of Roundup Ready sugar 
beets, and the parallel story of Roundup Ready alfalfa—which was 
similarly not approved for planting in 2011—highlights just how broken the 
United States regulatory system has become. 
 One undesirable side effect of widespread adoption of Roundup Ready 
crops has been an increasing and often exclusive reliance on glyphosate to 
manage weeds. Independent scientists have documented that, contrary to 
industry claims, GE crops were responsible for a 383 million pound 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Nat’l. Acad. of Sciences, Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on Farm Sustainability 
in the United States 3 (2010), http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12804.  
 109. The majority of glyphosate resistant crops have been developed and patented by Monsanto 
under the trade name Roundup Ready. However, Bayer, Pioneer and DeKalb also market crops 
genetically engineered to be resistant to glyphosate. Jerry M. Green, Evolution of Glyphosate-Resistant 
Crop Technology, 57 WEED SCIENCE 108, 108–09 (2009), 
http://allenpress.com/pdf/wees_57.1_108_117.pdf 
       110.  Id. at 108.  
       111. CLIVE JAMES, INT’L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY BRIEF 43: GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS, 5 (2011), 
available at http,://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/43/executivesummary/default.asp.  
       112.  USDA-ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, RECENT TRENDS IN GE ADOPTION, 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/03_32301p_fpra.pdf (last updated July 5, 2012).  
       113. Id.  
       114. USDA-ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, BACKGROUND: SUGAR & SWEETENERS, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/sugar-sweeteners/background.aspx (last updated Oct. 9 2012). 
       115.  Monsanto Company and KWS SAAT AG; Determination of Nonregulated Status of Sugar 
Beet Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,693, 42,693 
(July 20, 2012) (granting deregulated status in 2012 and allowing adoption of crop).  
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increase in herbicide use from 1996–2008.116 The bulk of this increase was 
associated with increased glyphosate use on Roundup Ready crops.117  
 According to the National Academy of Sciences, this overreliance on 
glyphosate has reduced the pesticide’s effectiveness as a weed management 
tool.118 Indeed, the increase in glyphosate use associated with widespread 
adoption of Roundup Ready crops has resulted in a growing epidemic of 
glyphosate-resistant weeds.119 Millions of acres are now infested with 
glyphosate-resistant horseweed, pigweed, ragweed, and waterhemp—with 
many fields harboring two or more resistant weeds.120 Growers report that 
glyphosate-resistant weeds significantly increase their costs per acre.121 
Unfortunately, since the introduction of glyphosate-resistant crops in 1996, 
ten species of Roundup-resistant weeds have been identified across more 
than twenty-two states.122 These so-called “superweeds” are also sprouting 
up in other countries that have embraced these GE crops.123 Currently, “a 
total of 19 weeds have evolved resistance to glyphosate worldwide.”124 
These “superweeds,” are not only driving substantial increases in the use of 
glyphosate, but also the increased use of more toxic herbicides, including 
paraquat and 2,4-D.125 To deal with resistant weeds, farmers are resorting to 
more toxic chemicals and more frequent spraying, and also to more intense 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Charles Benbrook, Impacts of Genetically Engineered Crops on Pesticide Use in the 
United States: The First Thirteen Years, THE ORGANIC CENTER CRITICAL ISSUE REPORT i (2009), 
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       120.   Benbrook, supra note 116, at 4. 
 121. Id. at 5–6. 
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commercially available. Are Superweeds an Outgrowth of USDA Biotech Policy: Hearing before the 
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(2010) (statement of Michael D.K. Owen, Ph.D., Professor of Agronomy at Iowa State University), 
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 123. Stephen B. Powles, Evolved Glyphosate-Resistant Weeds Around the World: Lessons to be 
Learnt, 64 PEST MGMT. SCI. 360, 362 (2008). 
        124.  Are Superweeds an Outgrowth of USDA Biotech Policy, supra note 122. See also 
International Survey of Herbicide Resistant Weeds. WEEDSCIENCE.ORG,  
http://www.weedscience.org/Summary/UspeciesMOA.asp?lstMOAID=12 (last visited April 25, 2013) 
(describing types of glyphosate-resistant weeds around the world, by species and country).  
        125.  Are Superweeds an Outgrowth of USDA Biotech Policy, supra note 122; Benbrook, supra 
note 116, at 4.  
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tillage of their fields—all actions with negative environmental 
consequences.  
 According to experts, this behavior reflects the fact that growers:  
 
Value the convenience and simplicity of these crops without 
appreciating the long-term ecological and economic risks 
attributable to the unvaried tactics they used. . . . That behavioral 
response might be expected given many farmers’ desire to meet 
short-run financial needs and the fact that other growers may not 
take similar control actions.126 
 
This phenomenon, known as the “tragedy of the commons,” is well-
documented.127 There is no question that “unless growers collectively adopt 
more diverse weed-management practices, individual farmer’s actions will 
fail to delay herbicide resistance to glyphosate because the resistant genes 
in weeds easily cross farm boundaries.”128 Indeed, it is precisely because 
individuals make decisions based on individual and short-term 
considerations that environmental regulation is necessary. Regulators, 
acting in the public interest, are supposed to put brakes on individual 
behaviors that, when viewed in isolation are beneficial to the actor, but 
when viewed in context produce socially-undesirable results.  
 The average citizen may be surprised by the lack of consideration 
given to the weed resistance problem in GE plant regulatory oversight. The 
risk is an obvious one and its ramifications quite serious. Nevertheless, it 
has not been part of the regulatory calculus to date. 
 For example, in 2005, APHIS granted Monsanto’s petition to 
deregulate Roundup Ready alfalfa, a version of alfalfa genetically 
engineered to be resistant to Monsanto’s Roundup herbicide.129 In granting 
this petition, APHIS concluded that the plant “should not reduce the ability 
to control pests and weeds in alfalfa or other crops.”130 That same year, 
APHIS also concluded that deregulation of GE sugar beets “should not 
reduce the ability to control pests and weeds in sugar beet or other 
crops.”131 It was quite remarkable that at a time when reports of the 
                                                                                                                 
        126.  Are Superweeds an Outgrowth of USDA Biotech Policy, supra note 122 at 5/7.  
        127.  Id.  
        128.  Id.  
        129.  Id.  
       130. USDA-APHIS, Notice: Monsanto Co. and Forage Genetics International; Availability 
Determination of Nonregulated Status for Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide 
Glyphosate, 70 Fed. Ref. 36,917, 36,918–19 (June 27, 2005). 
       131.  USDA, Monsanto Co. and KWS SAAT AG; Determination of Nonregulated Status for 
Sugar Beet Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 70 Fed. Reg.13,007, 
13,008 (March 17, 2005.)  
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evolution of weed resistance to glyphosate were beginning to pour in, the 
agency managed to reach this conclusion.132 It did so by bracketing the 
question of herbicide use associated with these crops from its plant pest 
analysis.133 The Sugar Beet Environmental Assessment specifically 
indicated that it “does not address the separate issue of the potential use of 
the herbicide glyphosate in conjunction with these plants.”134 Organic and 
conventional farmers challenged both decisions in federal court, alleging 
that the agency’s decision to deregulate these crops without first conducting 
an environmental impact statement (EIS) violated NEPA.135 The farmers 
alleged various significant impacts that necessitated an EIS, inter alia, that 
widespread, uncontrolled planting of glyphosate-tolerant alfalfa would 
increase the likelihood of glyphosate resistant weeds.136 
 NEPA is an action-forcing statute.137 It instructs federal agencies to 
conduct a “coherent and upfront environmental analysis”138 to ensure 
informed decision making. Whenever substantial questions are raised as to 
whether a project may cause significant environmental degradation, NEPA 
requires that an agency conduct an EIS in order to ensure that the agency 
“will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its decision after it is 
too late to correct.”139 NEPA requires federal agencies to analyze not only 
the direct impacts associated with a proposed action, but also the indirect 
and cumulative impacts.140 The statute deliberately casts a wide net—and 
defines broadly the environmental impacts to be evaluated. It is therefore 
somewhat astonishing that the agency claimed that it could fulfill its NEPA 
obligations by evaluating glyphosate-resistant crops without considering the 
effect that increased glyphosate use would have on the evolution of weed 
resistance. 
                                                                                                                 
       132.  Green, supra note 109, at 108.  
       133.  USDA-APHIS, PLANT PEST RISK ASSESSMENT OF EVEN H7-1 SUGAR BEET 3, 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/03_32301p_pea.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).  
 134. USDA-APHIS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT 
MONSANTO CO. AND KWS SAAT AG PETITION 03-323-01P, FOR DETERMINATION OF NON-REGULATED 
STATUS FOR ROUNDUP READY SUGAR BEET EVENT H7-1 3 (2004), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ 
brs/aphisdocs/03_32301p_pea.pdf.  
 135. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is “our basic national charter for 
protection of the environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a). NEPA directs federal agencies to prepare an EIS 
before undertaking “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).  
       136.  Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007), aff’d, 
570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 
130 S.Ct. 2473 (2010).   
       137.  Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979). 
 138. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 139. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989). 
 140. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, 1508.8(b).  
2013] Is Anyone Regulating? 945 
 
 In a February 2007 decision, the Northern District of California issued 
a stinging rebuke of the agency’s “cavalier” treatment of this serious 
question in Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns.141 In particular, the court 
applied that adjective to APHIS’s explanation for its decision not to require 
an EIS, which hinged on the assertion that “weed species often develop 
resistance to herbicides.”142 The Geertson Seed Farms court noted that 
although “one would expect that some federal agency is considering 
whether there is some risk to engineering all of America’s crops to include 
the gene that confers resistance to glyphosate,”143 it is not at all clear that 
any agency has explored this question, or even considers the question to be 
within its regulatory jurisdiction.  
 The court decried APHIS’s failure to consider the cumulative impacts 
of its decision to deregulate glyphosate-resistant GM crops. The court noted 
that “[w]hile the deregulation of one crop in and of itself might not pose a 
significant risk for the development of glyphosate resistant weeds, when all 
the crops are considered cumulatively such a risk may become apparent.”144 
Thus, the court found that APHIS had failed to take the “hard look” 
required under NEPA.145 
 After conducting the court ordered EIS, APHIS concluded in 2011 that 
Roundup Ready alfalfa “is unlikely to pose a greater plant pest risk than . . . 
other unmodified” alfalfa varieties even after acknowledging the risks and 
impacts of gene flow, increased herbicide use, threats to endangered 
species, and various socioeconomic impacts.146 APHIS’s rationale was that 
it had no authority under the Plant Protection Act to regulate herbicide use 
associated with glyphosate-tolerant plants, and that the EPA had concluded 
“there is no unreasonable environmental risk if the [glyphosate] user 
adheres to the labeled directions.”147 Readers should be clear about what 
that means. Based on the EPA’s decision to register the pesticide at all, 
APHIS concluded that the particular use of glyphosate associated with 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624, at *1. 
 142. Id.; see also, USDA-APHIS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO 
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: MONSANTO COMPANY AND FORAGE GENETICS INTERNATIONAL PETITION 04-
110-01P FOR NONREGULATED STATUS FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALFA EVENTS J101 AND J163 6 
(2005), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs2/04_11001p_com.pdf (“Some commenters are 
concerned that glyphosate use on glyphosate tolerant alfalfa may result in additional glyphosate resistant 
weeds. APHIS agrees that this may occur. Weed species have developed resistance to every widely used 
herbicide.”). 
 143. Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *11.  
 144. Id. at *10, *12.  
       145.   Id. at *12.  
       146.  ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: MONSANTO 
COMPANY AND FORAGE GENETICS INTERNATIONAL PETITION 04-110-01P FOR NONREGULATED STATUS 
FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALFA EVENTS J101 AND J163 6, at v–vii. 
 147. Id. at vi. 
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Roundup Ready alfalfa production will not adversely impact the 
environment.148  
 APHIS’s plant pest evaluation of Roundup Ready sugar beets was even 
more flimsy. It did not even address the problem of increased weed 
resistance, focusing instead only on the likelihood that the genetically 
engineered sugar beet would itself become a weed.149 
 To be clear, this means that no regulator considers the cumulative 
environmental impacts of glyphosate use before glyphosate-resistant crops 
are approved for market even though the entire raison d’etre for these 
plants is their tolerance to glyphosate. Monsanto markets—and farmers 
purchase—these seeds because the fields can be treated with glyphosate. 
The fact that these plants will be sprayed with glyphosate is their most 
salient characteristic—one that should be front and center in any assessment 
of this technology’s environmental impact. It makes no sense to evaluate 
the potentials for impacts to the human environment from these crops while 
excluding as somehow unrelated glyphosate use in conjunction with these 
plants. 
 This absurd result flows directly from the thirty-year-old choice to 
regulate the products of genetic engineering without creating any new laws. 
The EPA’s sole regulatory authority is to decide whether to register the 
herbicide glyphosate for sale at all.150 While the EPA has authority over 
glyphosate, it has no authority to regulate the plantings of glyphosate-
tolerant crops, or to regulate the actual pesticide use associated with those 
crops.151 The USDA-APHIS does have authority over the plants, but 
considers the use of glyphosate in conjunction with those plants to be 
outside its regulatory authority.152 As a result, glyphosate-tolerant crops 
have been deregulated without considering whether growing these crops 
will increase or change glyphosate use.153  
 The evolution of weed resistance from overplanting glyphosate-
resistant crops is entirely predictable, and thoroughly well-understood. 
Indeed, critics have been vocal since the mid-1990s about this risk. Agency 
neglect of this obvious and critical environmental issue was perhaps less 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id.  
 149. USDA-APHIS, PLANT RISK ASSESSMENT OF EVENT H7-1 SUGAR BEET, supra note 133, at 
8–11.  
       150.   See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (describing EPA’s pesticide regulatory authority). 
       151.   See id. (authorizing EPA to approve pesticides for sale). 
 152. USDA-APHIS, FINAL EIS FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALA, supra note 134, at vi. 
 153. In assessing the likelihood that glyphosate-resistant sugar beets would change cultivation 
practices, USDA notes that “[o]ther than the use of glyphosate to control weeds, none of the 
management practices currently employed for conventional sugar beet cultivation is expected to 
change.” USDA-APHIS, PLANT RISK ASSESSMENT OF EVENT H7-1 SUGAR BEET, supra note 133, at 11.  
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blameworthy in the early days of GE crops, when regulators were writing 
on something of a tabula rasa. However, it is astonishing that even as 
“superweeds” resistant to glyphosate continue to proliferate, the regulatory 
scheme is unable to catch up. This massive regulatory gap means that a 
major and obvious environmental impact of these crops remains 
unexamined. There is no question that widespread planting of yet-another 
glyphosate crop can only worsen the well-documented and growing 
problem of glyphosate-resistant weeds. A regulatory system that cannot, or 
will not, analyze the cumulative effects of glyphosate-resistant crops on the 
development of glyphosate-resistant weeds in deciding whether to approve 
commercialization of these crops defies logic. Whatever other adjectives 
might apply to this decision, “scientific” is surely not one of them.  
 APHIS artificially limits its inquiry to an assessment of whether the GE 
plant poses a greater plant pest risk than an equivalent non-GE organism. In 
making this assessment, APHIS considers each modified plant in isolation, 
rather than for cumulative impacts in conjunction with use of the glyphosate 
herbicide that these plants have been engineered to tolerate.154 Concluding 
that each such engineered plant, in isolation, poses no greater plant pest risk 
than its unmodified counterpart, APHIS has routinely approved petitions for 
deregulated status. Once a crop is granted deregulated status it can be 
planted anywhere in the country.  
B. Social and Economic Impacts of the Technology: Grower Inability to 
Grow Organic or Conventional Crops because of Pollen Drift 
 A second major gap in the regulatory oversight of glyphosate-resistant 
crops has been the regulators’ failure to address the problems associated 
with pollen drift—specifically the potential for GE crops to contaminate 
nearby fields. This concern particularly impacts organic farmers, but is 
increasingly a concern in a globalized commodity market because the 
United States allows production of many GE varieties not approved for sale 
in the European Union, Japan, and other major markets.155 Even though this 
impact from GE crops is well documented and obvious, the convoluted 
regulatory scheme created by the Coordinated Framework virtually assures 
that it goes unconsidered. 
                                                                                                                 
       154.  Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 2007 WL 518624, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007), aff’d, 
570 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 
130 S.Ct. 2473 (2010).   
       155.  See, e.g., id. (discussing alfalfa farmers concerns of contaminated crops when 75% of U.S. 
exported alfalfa is exported to Japan, which does not permit glyphosate tolerant alfalfa).  
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 In two recent deregulation decisions, the USDA-APHIS took the 
position that it was not required to consider this question before approving 
glyphosate-resistant crops.156 The agency’s rationale was that NEPA 
directed the agency only to consider physical environmental harms and not 
social or economic harms flowing from physical environmental impacts.157 
Moreover, the USDA-APHIS also interpreted its Plant Protection Act 
authority narrowly to avoid treating cross-contamination as an “indirect” 
plant pest risk under the Act.158 
 Two different federal courts rejected this interpretation of the agency’s 
regulatory authority.159 The Center for Food Safety court characterized the 
USDA-APHIS’s treatment of this issue as “cursory.”160 The Geertson Seed 
Farms court found the agency’s analysis to be “wholly inadequate.”161 In 
both cases, the USDA-APHIS’s refusal to consider the question of pollen 
drift and cross-contamination issue drew sharp judicial rebuke. 
 Both courts began with the proposition that NEPA directs federal 
agencies to prepare an EIS before undertaking “major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”162 The courts 
noted that “human environment” has been comprehensively interpreted “to 
include the natural and physical environment and the relationship of people 
with that environment.”163 To determine whether NEPA requires an agency 
to consider a particular effect, the Supreme Court has directed agencies to 
“look at the relationship between that effect and the change in the physical 
environment caused by the major federal action at issue.”164 The plaintiffs 
in both cases succeeded in persuading federal courts that this capacious 
                                                                                                                 
     156.  Id. at *7; Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227, at *8 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2009). 
 157. Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *7.  
       158.  Id. at *6 (discussing how APHIS did not determine that no cross-contamination would 
occur; rather, it interpreted the responsibility for preventing cross-contamination as belonging to farmers 
themselves—that is, even though APHIS did not contemplate how farmers could prevent cross-
contamination, farmers are still responsible for preventing their own crops from undergoing 
contamination). 
 159. Id. at *9.  
 160. Ctr. for Food Safety, 2009 WL 3047227, at *8–9 (noting that APHIS offered the following 
“conclusory” statement in the EA: 
It is not likely that organic farmers, or other farmers who chose not to plant 
transgenic varieties or sell transgenic sugar beets, will be significantly impacted 
by the expected commercial use of this product since: (a) non-transgenic sugar 
beet will likely still be sold and will be available to those who wish to plant it; (b) 
farmers purchasing seed will know this product is transgenic because it will be 
marked and labeled as glyphosate tolerant.)  
 161. Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *7. 
 162. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
 163. CEQ Definition of Human Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1978) (emphasis added). 
 164. Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 773 (1983). 
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definition gave the agency scope to consider and address the desire of 
organic and conventional farmers not to have their fields and crops 
contaminated with GE pollen.165 By ignoring this question, the USDA-
APHIS failed to take the requisite “hard look” at the economic impacts of 
its deregulation determination on conventional and organic farmers.166 
 The courts directed the USDA-APHIS to go back to the drawing board 
and to consider whether pollen flows from fields planted with GE crops to 
those growing conventional or organic crops was an unacceptable 
environmental impact.167 Embedded in this inquiry was an important 
subtext: Who should bear the costs and risks associated with avoiding this 
impact?168 The Center for Food Safety allegations that wind-blown pollen 
from GE sugar beets would contaminate conventional sugar beets and other 
closely related crops, such as chard and red table beets placed this question 
squarely before the court.169 The Geertson Seed Farms court found that 
cross-contamination of seed alfalfa was not only a “realistic potential” but 
“especially likely” given the geographic concentration of alfalfa seed 
production.170  
 Conventional and organic growers expressed concern that if Roundup 
Ready sugar beets and alfalfa were deregulated, pollen from the GE crops 
would contaminate their fields.171 The consequences of this pollen flow172 
                                                                                                                 
 165. In Geertson Seed Farms, for example, the court concluded that “the economic effects on 
the organic and conventional farmers of the government's deregulation decision are interrelated with, 
and, indeed, a direct result of, the effect on the physical environment.” Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 
518624, at *8. 
 166. Id.   
       167.  Id. at *12. 
       168.  Id. at *6 (raising concerns that conventional farmers were being forced to bear the burden 
of preventing cross-contamination to their own crops).  
       169.  Complaint for Decl. & Injunctive Relief at ¶ 2 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Conner, No. C 08-
00484 JSW, 2009 WL 4724033 (N.D. Cal. 2008), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/ 
Final%20Complaint.pdf. Upon his January 2009 appointment as Secretary of Agriculture, Tom Vilsack 
replaced acting-Secretary Charles Conner as the named defendant.   
       170.  Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *5.  
       171.  Id. at *2.  
 172. Monsanto’s Technology/Stewardship Agreement with its growers shifts all risk of liability 
for cross-contamination to the growers themselves. The 2011 Monsanto Technology/Stewardship 
Agreement provides, in relevant part:  
REMEDY OF THE GROWER AND THE LIMIT OF THE LIABILITY OF 
MONSANTO OR ANY SELLER FOR ANY AND ALL LOSSES, INJURY OR 
DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR HANDLING OF SEED 
(INCLUDING CLAIMS BASED IN CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE, PRODUCT 
LIABILITY, STRICT LIABILITY, TORT, OR OTHERWISE) SHALL BE THE 
PRICE PAID BY THE GROWER FOR THE QUANTITY OF THE SEED 
INVOLVED OR, AT THE ELECTION OF MONSANTO OR THE SEED 
SELLER, THE REPLACEMENT OF THE SEED. IN NO EVENT SHALL 
MONSANTO OR ANY SELLER BE LIABLE FOR ANY INCIDENTAL, 
CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL, OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES.  
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would be very serious for those growers—contamination can result in 
organic farmers losing their organic status, and can subject conventional or 
organic growers to patent-infringement claims if GE crops are found, even 
inadvertently, on their land.173 In addition, cross-contamination can disrupt 
export markets because many GE crops approved in the United States are 
not similarly approved in the European Union, Japan, and other major 
markets.174  
 The deregulation decision was the critical moment to address this issue 
of cross-contamination because it was the only moment at which the agency 
had the ability to impose isolation distances on the growers of the GE crops. 
Once a crop is granted deregulated status, it can be planted anywhere in the 
country.175 But, if the USDA-APHIS concluded that the problem of 
contamination was a significant one, it could have decided to approve a 
partial deregulation that allowed glyphosate resistant crops to be grown 
only in certain geographic areas, or under certain conditions, including 
isolation distances from conventional or organic crops.176 The deregulation 
petition was thus a “now-or-never” moment for considering the question of 
cross-contamination. Yet, even after finding that the agency’s sugar beet 
                                                                                                                 
2011 Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement, WORDPRESS.COM, 
http://thefarmerslife.files.wordpress.com/ 2012/02/scan_doc0004.pdf (capitals in original) (last visited 
April 25, 2013). 
 173. Between 1997–2010, Monsanto filed 144 patent infringement lawsuits against US farmers, 
with at least 700 and maybe thousands of cases settled out of court. This issue is of such concern that 
growers sought to protect themselves with a pre-emptive suit seeking to enjoin Monsanto from suing 
them for patent infringement based on pollen drift. See Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. 
Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (seeking declaratory judgment that 
farmers, seed companies, and organizations are not infringing on Monsanto’s patents, that those patents 
are unenforceable, and even if they are enforceable, Monsanto is not entitled to remedies against 
farmers, seed companies, and organizations). The case was dismissed in February 2012 for lack of 
standing and is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit. 
 174. This concern was particularly acute for alfalfa because 75% of the alfalfa exported from the 
United States goes to Japan, and Japan does not permit the import of glyphosate-resistant alfalfa. 
Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *2. In its deregulation determination issued after this 
litigation, USDA-APHIS acknowledged that “the extent to which GE sensitive domestic and foreign 
markets are affected by GT alfalfa deregulation depends on the extent to which gene flow can be 
controlled through stewardship programs.” USDA-APHIS, RECORD OF DECISION: GLYPHOSATE-
TOLERANT ALFALFA EVENTS J101 AND J163: REQUEST FOR NONREGULATED STATUS 13 (2011). 
Without demanding any showing about the possibility or effectiveness of stewardship programs, USDA 
used the possibility of such programs to disregard this clear environmental and social impact from 
deregulating a GM crop. 
       175.   Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *3.  
 176. USDA-APHIS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: GLYPHOSATE-TOLERANT 
ALFALFA EVENTS J-101 AND J-163: REQUEST FOR NONREGULATED STATUS 10–16 (2010), 
http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/AlfalfaEIS.pdf.; USDA-APHIS, 
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: H7-1 SUGAR BEET: REQUEST FOR NONREGULATED 
STATUS 20–32 (May 2012), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/ 
sugarbeet_documents.shtml. 
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decision violated NEPA,177 the Center for Food Safety court expressed 
concern that the agency was still “not taking the process seriously.”178 
 The USDA-APHIS did not dispute that cross-contamination had 
already occurred and might continue to occur. The agency nevertheless 
decided to deregulate the glyphosate-tolerant crops despite this problem.179 
The USDA-APHIS justified deregulating these crops by concluding that 
such cross-contamination did not amount to a significant environmental 
impact because it was the organic and conventional farmer who had the 
burden of preventing contamination, not the farmer planting glyphosate-
resistant crops.180 The agency made no inquiry into whether those farmers 
who do not want to grow GE alfalfa or GE sugar beets could, in fact, 
protect their crops from contamination.181 Instead, in both cases, the USDA-
APHIS concluded that the risk of gene transmission was not significant 
because “organic production operations must develop and maintain an 
organic production system plan that outlines the steps it will take to avoid 
cross pollination from neighboring operations.”182  
 Once again, claims that regulation of these crops is science-based 
crumble on closer examination. The agency simply assumed, without 
investigation, that farmers intending to grow conventional or organic crops 
would be able to cope with the effects of cross-contamination. Indeed, the 
agency noted that it would be up to the individual organic or conventional 
grower to take measures to assure that their crops will not include any GE 
contamination.183 In other words, the agency dodged the question by 
placing the responsibility squarely on those who objected to cross-
contamination without considering whether it was possible for those actors 
to prevent cross-contamination. Whatever else this decision is, it is hardly 
an example of evidence-driven, scientific regulation.  
                                                                                                                 
 177.  Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227, at *9 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 21, 2009). 
 178. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948, 953 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  
 179. USDA-APHIS, FINAL EIS FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALA, supra note 176, at 10–16; 
USDA-APHIS, SUGAR BEET FINAL EIS, supra note 176, at 20,–32. 
       180.  USDA-APHIS, FINAL EIS FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALA, supra note 176, at 15.  
       181.  Geertson Seed Farms, 2007 WL 518624, at *6.  
 182. USDA-APHIS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: 
MONSANTO COMPANY AND FORAGE GENETICS INTERNATIONAL PETITION 04-110-01P FOR 
NONREGULATED STATUS FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALFA EVENTS J101 AND J163 2 (2005) 
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs2/04_11001p_com.pdf; USDA-APHIS, ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT MONSANTO CO. AND KWS SAAT AG PETITION 
03-323-01P, FOR DETERMINATION OF NON-REGULATED STATUS FOR ROUNDUP READY SUGAR BEET 
EVENT H7-1 13 (2004), http://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/aphisdocs/03_32301p_pea.pdf.  
 183. USDA-APHIS, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT FOR ROUNDUP READY ALFALFA, 
supra note 182.  
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C. Consumer Disempowerment: Lack of Transparency 
 In 2003, the European Union adopted regulations establishing a system 
to trace and label genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and to regulate 
the sale and labeling of food derived from them.184 In 2008, the European 
Union reaffirmed the need for labeling thresholds for GMOs in 
conventional seeds, emphasizing that the thresholds must be set at the 
lowest practicable levels in order to ensure freedom of choice for producers 
and consumers.185 
 In the United States, by contrast, there are no labeling requirements of 
any kind for GE foods. This remains the case even though polls consistently 
show that the majority of Americans support labeling of GE foods. Indeed, 
in a 2010 Thompson Reuters poll, 93% of respondents thought that foods 
should be labeled to indicate that they have been genetically engineered or 
contain GE ingredients.186 This desire for labels did not necessarily mean 
that surveyed consumers wanted to avoid these products—60% expressed a 
willingness to eat GE vegetables, fruits, and grains but far fewer, 35–38%, 
were willing to eat GE animals.187 The overwhelming support for labeling 
must therefore be read as a desire for transparency—a vote in favor of the 
Right to Know. For labeling advocates, the issue is “the fundamental right 
to know about the food we eat.”188 Without access to key information, 
consumers have no means for expressing their preferences in a market 
economy. By contrast, Monsanto argues that “[r]equiring labeling for 
ingredients that don’t pose a health issue would undermine both our 
labeling laws and consumer confidence.”189 
 Monsanto’s position might have been tenable if the risk assessment 
process for these novel foods was a transparent, public process in which 
concerned citizens could participate and review a well-developed body of 
safety information. However, no such process exists in the United States. 
Purveyors of these products make a GRAS determination on their own, 
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deciding whether the foods are substantially equivalent to non-modified 
foods.190 Although these actors may consult with the FDA, they have no 
obligation to do so, nor do they have an obligation to present a full and 
complete record of all their data—including negative data—to the 
agency.191 Moreover, because companies claim that much of the submitted 
information amounts to confidential business information under the Trade 
Secrets Act, the FDA cannot make much of the information it does receive 
available to the public.192 
 Why should consumers trust such a secretive process? It is a lack of 
transparency and perceived lack of democratic legitimacy that drives the 
labeling demand. The organization Just Label It has submitted a citizens’ 
petition signed by more than one million citizens requesting that the FDA 
engage in rulemaking to require labeling of GE foods.193 To date, the FDA 
has taken no action. 
 In the absence of federal action on this point, a number of states have 
expressed an interest in using state law to require labeling of GE foods.194 
Rather than recognizing and meeting a genuine demand for information, 
industry has not hesitated to spend liberally to thwart these measures.195  
 The most recent example of how industry has flexed its muscles to 
prevent labeling was California’s Proposition 37. Proposition 37 would 
have redefined “misbranded food” to include any food either produced by 
genetic engineering or containing an ingredient produced by genetic 
engineering unless the food was labeled accordingly.196 The measure would 
also have prohibited any food produced with genetic engineering from 
being labeled “natural.”197 The “No on 37” campaign had the backing of 
large agribusiness and chemical companies.198 The “Yes on 37” campaign 
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was supported largely by the organic industry, consumer groups, and 
alternative medicine organizations.199 
 The ballot initiative was initially extremely popular, holding a two-to-
one lead in the polls for much of the election season.200 In the weeks leading 
up to the election, the “No on 37” campaign spent $46 million blanketing 
the state with “No on 37” ads and mailers.201 By contrast, supporters of the 
initiative collected and spent just over $9 million.202 The ballot initiative 
was ultimately defeated 51.4% to 48.6%.203 A similar referendum initiative 
is on tap in Washington State, while Vermont and Connecticut both 
considered legislative measures that would have required similar 
labeling.204 Both legislative measures were tabled after Monsanto 
threatened lawsuits.205 The industry argument against labeling boils down to 
the assertion that despite expressed consumer interest in obtaining this 
information, they are not entitled to the information because it is not 
relevant. And, the main reason that the information is not relevant is that 
these crops are the substantial equivalent of unmodified crops—a decision 
made behind closed doors by the very entities opposing the right to know. 
In short, consumers have no right to know this information because the 
industry has decided that there are no risks. 
 The industry desire for secrecy extends from consumers to growers. 
For many decades prior to genetic engineering, farmers relied on university 
agriculture extension scientists to perform tests comparing new and 
standard crop varieties.206 But it is increasingly difficult for university 
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scientists to evaluate GE seed varieties because they are prohibited from 
doing research on patented GE crops without company permission.207 And 
when scientists do receive permission to do research, it is usually with 
strings attached that restrict the usefulness of the studies for comparing crop 
varieties.208 Indeed, the situation has gotten so bad that, in a public 
statement to the EPA, twenty-six eminent entomologists warned that as a 
result of industry restrictions on access to GE seeds for research purposes, 
“no truly independent research can be legally conducted on many critical 
questions regarding the technology, its performance, [and] its management 
implications.”209  
 This chokehold on research gives companies “the potential to launder 
the data . . . [and] information that is submitted”210 for agency 
consideration. With all information tightly controlled by an industry that 
doles out research permission based on perceived favorability of results, 
and whether the researcher is “friendly” or “hostile” 211 is it any wonder that 
the public is suspicious? 
 This lack of information is particularly ironic given that the USDA and 
the EPA both identify transparency as a core value.212 Yet, in the context of 
GE crops, the agencies have not taken steps to promote much transparency. 
For example, the EPA could easily require that as a condition for 
registration of a Bt plant, the purveyor must agree to give university 
scientists unfettered research access to seeds. The USDA could do the same 
in its deregulation decisions. In refusing to take these basic transparency 
positions, the regulators have aligned themselves with industry in 
opposition to any moves toward transparency, including labeling.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The United States regulatory system for genetically engineered crops is 
riddled with major gaps and omissions. Omitted from the regulatory inquiry 
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are systemic environmental issues213 including the possibility of gene 
transfer to non-genetically engineered plants through cross-pollination; the 
cumulative effects of multiple genetically engineered crops on the evolution 
of pest resistance; and the probability of increased herbicide use. The 
neglected environmental, social, and economic issues have contributed to a 
profound lack of regulatory transparency in the regulation of genetically 
engineered crops, and the resulting erosion of trust in government more 
generally.  
 Nothing shatters public confidence in a regulatory system more than 
the sense that obvious public interests and concerns are not being 
addressed. The time is ripe to improve the regulation of agricultural 
biotechnology. It is past time to consider whether we can establish a 
rigorous regulatory process that independently reviews and approves 
products that are safe for consumers and the environment. Such a system is 
essential if consumers are to have confidence in biotechnology going 
forward. 
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